Abstract. In 2008, Wan et al. presented an anonymous ID-based group key agreement scheme for wireless networks, for which they claim that it ensures anonymity and unlinkability of the group members, as well as forward and backward secrecy of the group session key. In this paper, we show that forward and backward secrecy do not hold for the protocol. We propose a correction that introduces a shielding factor that protects each member's input to the group key. we also introduce a new feature that assures the correctness of the key as computed by all group members. This results in an increased computation cost, due to extra public key operations, and a similar communication cost. We also show in which practical setting the protocol can be deployed.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose an improved version of the anonymous ID-based group key agreement scheme for wireless networks by Wan et al. [1] , and present a scenario in which such a scheme can be used. The original scheme claims to provide group member anonymity from outside eavesdroppers, and forward and backward group key secrecy from leaving resp. joining group members. We show that these claims are incorrect and propose an improved protocol. In Sect. 2, we introduce ID-based cryptography, the original protocol by Wan et al. and its vulnerabilities. The main problem with the protocol is that most of the shares of the previously agreed group key remain unaltered in the computation of the new group key, such that joining/leaving members can reconstruct the old/new group key. The improvement, presented in Sect. 3 involves the introduction of a session ID to protect the previously established group key shares. In Sect. 4 we analyse the performance loss, and indicate why the improvements fix the original protocol. Finally, we show how the protocol can be used in the practical setting of a Virtual Private Ad Hoc Network (VPAN), and we conclude with ideas for future work.
The setting in which we operate is as follows: a dynamic set of devices wants to establish a shared secret group key in a privacy-preserving way. 'Dynamic' means that devices can join or leave, albeit at a slow pace (a couple of devices per hour). Encryption with an authenticated group key will ensure confidentiality, but we also require the following: -Anonymity: a group member remains anonymous for an outsider; -Unlinkability: an outsider should be unable to link a group member across sessions with different group keys; -Backward and forward secrecy: only the members that were involved in the group key generation should be able to construct the group key. Being part of the group in the past (forward secrecy) or the future (backward secrecy) leaks no information on the 'current' group key. -Perfect forward secrecy: in case of master key compromise, all previous group keys should remain secret.
ID-based Protocol by Wan et al.
The group key agreement scheme of Wan et al. in [1] is based on ID-based public-key cryptography in which the public key of a user is derived from its identity. Identity Based Encryption (IBE) was proposed by Shamir [2] in 1984, and one of the first practical IBE schemes [3, 4] is based on bilinear maps. In IBE, a trusted server S, called a Private Key Generator (PKG), provides private keys for all participating group members using a randomly chosen master secret s and the identity of each user, after checking his ID. The focus on this paper is on how to fix the scheme of Wan et al., but many similar schemes have been proposed; one example of similar work can be found in [5] , which also contains some references to other schemes, and a survey [6] of key agreement protocols. The mathematical setup for the protocol in [1] can be summarised as follows: the PKG selects two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of order q for some large prime q, and a bilinear mappingê :
The PKG determines the generator P ∈ G 1 , a master secret s ∈ R Z q \ {0}, and a public value P pub = sP . The public parameters q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, H 1 , P, P pub are distributed to all users in the system, where H 1 is a hash function, H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 , used to embed identity values in G 1 : For a user with identity U i , the PKG generates the private key PrK i = sH 1 (U i ), for which the corresponding public key is the user's identity PuK i = U i . In the remainder of the text,
The building blocks of the anonymous ID-based group key agreement protocol presented by Wan et al., which is based on [7, 8] , are: group initialisation, the join protocol and the leave protocol.
Initialisation Protocol
The initialisation protocol is executed when an initiator U 1 wants to have a private group session with a set of users {U 2 , . . . , U n }.
, where r 1 ∈ R Z q and L = U 1 . . . U n N ym 1 . . . N ym n , the concatenation of the identities U i and the related pseudonyms N ym i . L is signed with U 1 's private key, and encrypted with the recipient's (U i ) public key.
The users U i , (i = 1) decrypt the message from Round 1, retrieve their pseudonym N ym i , which is sent, together with r i P, r i ∈ R Z q to the users U i−1 and U i+1 :
]: Each U i broadcasts his N ym i with a key share X i = k i /k i−1 , depending on his private key PrK i = su i , the random number r i and the points r i−1 P and r i+1 P from Round 2:
The bilinear property of the mappingê ensures the consistency of the subkeys k i :
Group key K generation: Each user U i receives all X j , (j = i), and computes 2 the 'subkeys' k i+1 ,k i+2 ,. . . ,k i+n−1 , from his own subkey k i :
and forms the group key
who checks the consistency of the group key K.
Join Protocol
When the join protocol is executed to add a new user U n+1 to the group, the group key is updated to ensure backward secrecy.
Round 1: U 1 generates N ym n+1 for U n+1 and initiates the protocol:
Round 2: U n+1 obtains N ym n+1 , chooses r n+1 ∈ R Z q and computes two subkeys k n+1 = h(ê(u 1 , PrK n+1 ) r n+1 r 1 P ) and k n = h(ê(u n , PrK n+1 )) r n+1 r n P ). U n+1 then sends his information to U 1 and U n :
Round 3: U 1 and U n compute k n+1 and k n respectively:
Then they compute the new X-values X 1 = k 1 /k n+1 and X n = k n /k n−1 , and distribute them to the new group:
Group key K update: Every group member (including U n+1 ) can now compute all the subkeys k i , i = 1, . . . , n + 1 with the altered k n and the new k n+1 with the following sequence of calculations 4 (illustrated for user U n−1 ):
, is formed and checked in the same way as in the initialisation protocol.
Leave Protocol
This protocol ensures forward secrecy when a group member U i leaves.
Round 1: U 1 assigns new pseudonyms to U i−1 and U i+1 , using the current group key K:
Round 2: U i−1 and U i+1 verify the signature of U 1 and exchange new parameters r i−1 P and r i+1 P using their new pseudonyms:
Round 3: U i−1 and U i+1 recompute their (equal) subkeys k i−1 and k i :
Next, the updated X-values are computed and distributed:
Group key K update: The remaining n − 1 group members can now compute the updated group key
, which is checked in the same way as in the initialisation protocol.
Security Properties
Forward and backward secrecy are not met in the described protocols, contrary to the claims in [1] . In the adversary model, we assume a global, active attacker who is capable of eavesdropping, injecting, modifying or dropping messages within the network at will.
Forward secrecy: In the leave protocol described above, forward secrecy is not guaranteed. In round 3 of the protocol, the leaving member U i can obtain the values X i−1 and X i+1 in two ways: they are sent unprotected to U 1 AND they are broadcasted under the old group key K in (6). U i already knows k i (i = 1, . . . , n), from the old group key, and only needs to recover the updated subkey k i−1 = k i , to get the new group key
, which can be done from X i−1 and X i+1 :
Backward secrecy: Backward secrecy is not ensured by the group member join protocol. At the end of this protocol, user U n+1 computes the new group key K = H(k 1 . . . k n−1 k n k n+1 ) knowing all subkeys k i . To be able to compute K, only k n is missing, which can be computed from X 1 = k 1 /k n or X n = k n /k n−1 , sent around unencrypted in the previous session, which U n+1 could have monitored.
Improved Protocol
Forward and backward secrecy can be ensured by the following improved leave/join protocols. Our improvement, partially based on ideas of Jung [9] , makes use of a session ID, denoted as SID. This random string, unique for each new group session is newly generated and distributed by U 1 in each join/leave protocol. The SID will blind all subkeys k, such that each member will affect the updated group key. Below we describe the difference to the original protocol, for the building blocks described in Sect. 2.
Initialisation Protocol
(1)
Fig. 1. Initialisation Protocol
Round 1: U 1 generates a SID and adds it to the encrypted and signed message, sent to each user U i , in which L = U 1 . . . U n N ym 1 . . . N ym n SID:
Round 2: No changes to the original protocol. Round 3: Each U i calculates k i and k i−1 as in the original. X i is different:
X i now also depends on SID, and will be updated with each change of the group. As before N ym i , X i is broadcasted to all other users.
Group key K generation: Each U i executes a series of calculations:
. . .
At the end, SID) , and the group key K is formed:
Group key K consistency verification: In the original scheme, each U i , (i = 1) sends the same check value to U 1 , which means that U 1 cannot verify its origin. In our version of the protocol, the confirmation message can only be generated by a legitimate U i :
Join Protocol
(1b)
(2) (a) Round-step 1 & 2
Fig. 2. Join Protocol
Round 1: U 1 generates a new session ID, denoted as SID . Next U 1 informs all members U i , (i = 1, . . . , n) and U n+1 about U n+1 's joining, and assigns new pseudonyms N ym i to all U i and a pseudonym N ym n+1 to U n+1 5 :
Round 2: After decryption, U n+1 obtains the pseudonyms of all U i , (i = 1, . . . , n + 1), chooses r n+1 ∈ R Z q and computes k n+1 and k n as in the original protocol. He also computes his own X n+1 = H(k n+1 SID ) ⊕ H(k n SID ) and sends N ym n+1 , r n+1 P to U 1 and U n .
Round 3: Upon reception of r n+1 P , U 1 and U n can compute subkeys k n+1 and k n as before and recompute their X-values:
The other users U i need to update their X-value as well:
Finally, all group members broadcast their new X-values to all other users along with their new pseudonym:
Group key K update: Each user can now compute every H(k i SID ), using the X-values, and compute and verify the new group key K 6 : SID ) ) .
Leave Protocol
(3) (3) (b) Round-step 3 Fig. 3 . Leave Protocol 6 The consistency verification is identical to the one in the initialisation protocol. Round 1: When U i wants to leave the current session, U 1 generates a new SID and informs all remaining group members by broadcasting:
in which new pseudonyms N ym i are assigned.
Round 2: Upon reception of their new pseudonym, U i−1 and U i+1 exchange their new values r i−1 P and r i+1 P , as in the original protocol.
Round 3: Then, U i−1 and U i+1 recompute their subkeys k i−1 and k i , again as in the original protocol, and compute their X-values:
Finally, all remaining group members broadcast their new X-value:
Group key K update: Each user can now compute every H(k i SID ) 7 , using the X-values, and compute and verify the new group key K 8 :
Security and Performance Analysis

Security
Here we informally show that our scheme ensures all the requirements, including forward/backward secrecy. In the security analysis below, we assume that the adversary knows the current SID, unless otherwise stated.
Anonymity: The identities of the users U i are encrypted at all times in the protocols, either by anonymous ID-based encryption using their public keys PuK i or by symmetric encryption using the group key K. In all protocols, identities are masked by pseudonyms constructed by the initiator U 1 . The use of identities and private keys in the calculation of the values X i is masked by hashing with a random point in G 1 ; identity information cannot be retrieved without the master secret s or the user's private key PrK i .
Unlinkability: Anonymity alone only hides the real identities of the group members. To prevent an adversary from tracing a user by his pseudonym, pseudonyms or X-values are never re-used when the group changes and a new group key needs to be established. Therefore, a user U i is able to join or leave a private group session anonymously.
Group key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy: If an attacker knows SID, the group key K = H(H(k 1 , SID) H(k 2 , SID) . . . H(k n , SID)) remains secure: to retrieve K, he needs access to at least one user's shared subkey k i , to compute the other subkeys k j from the broadcasted X-values. The subkey k i = h(ê(u i+1 , PrK i ) r i r i+1 P ) cannot be computed without knowing U i+1 , the private key PrK i and the element r i r i+1 P : -The IDs U i are encrypted, and only known to the participating members; -The private key of the users is never shared and can only be computed with the master secret s; -The element r i r i+1 P cannot be computed from the exchanged r i P and r i+1 P because of the ECDHP assumption [10] .
Knowing the identities U i next to SID, is also insufficient to compute k i without having knowledge of the master secret s or the private keys PrK i , sincê e(u i+1 , PrK i ) =ê(u i+1 , su i ). The argumentation above shows that the group key K cannot be retrieved by the adversary in our threat model. Even in case when the long-term master secret s is compromised and the identities of the participating members are revealed, group keys from previous stages remain uncompromised, because of the last argument in the list above, such that the protocol is also perfectly forward secret.
Forward and backward secrecy: Forward and backward secrecy should be ensured for the leaving and joining protocol respectively. Each time the group membership changes, the initiator U 1 introduces a new SID and the group key is updated. While each user U i still computes both subkeys k i and k i−1 , he will share H(k i SID ), instead of the unprotected k i . This is done by broadcasting X i = H(k i SID ) ⊕ H(k i−1 SID ). A joining/leaving member is unable to compromise a past/future group key K:
1. the only subkeys k a joining/leaving member knows are his own, which are both newly generated or updated during the join/leave protocol such that the knowledge of the previous SID/updated SID cannot be used to compute a previous/updated group key; 2. each user's shared contribution and the corresponding X-value are SIDdependent, and are updated and re-broadcasted in the join/leave protocol.
